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Abstrak
Latar belakang: Laboratorium Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kesehatan (Balitbangkes) ditunjuk sebagai 
laboratorium rujukan nasional dalam mendeteksi penyakit infeksi Emerging (EID) dan bertugas dalam mendeteksi 
pathogen infeksius serta berperan penting dalam sistem penanggulangan wabah. Laboratorium Balitbangkes 
harus menerapkan sistem manajemen biorisiko untuk mencegah terjadinya penyebaran penyakit yang bersumber 
dari laboratorium. Penerapan manajemen biorisk laboratorium yang terdiri dari biosafety dan biosecurity 
bertujuan untuk melindungi pekerja, lingkungan dan produk atau agen biologi. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk 
menemukan kesenjangan terkait penerapan manajemen biorisk di Laboratorium Balitbangkes dengan standar. 
Metode: Studi dilakukan oleh Asesor professional pada tahun 2015 dengan mewawancara Penanggung jawab 
Laboratorium BSL-3 (PJ BSL-3) dan Biosafety Officer (BSO) serta pemeriksaan dokumen. Pemilihan responden 
berdasarkan jabatannya di laboratorium. Responden dipilih karena sebagai pelaksana teknis dan memiliki 
informasi pelaksanaan biosafety dan biosecurity yang mendalam di laboratorium Balitbangkes.  Pertanyaan 
diadopsi berdasarkan CWA 15793: 2011, berisi 160 pertanyaan dari 16 elemen. Analisis skor diinterpretasikan 
antara 0-2. Skor 0 memenuhi kesesuaian dengan standar dan skor 2 berarti tidak memenuhi standar.
Hasil: Studi ini  menunjukan 3 dari 16 elemen, memiliki kesesuaian penuh dengan standar yaitu teknik mikrobiologi 
yang baik, alat pelindung diri serta peralatan dan pemeliharaan alat laboratorium. Elemen yang memiliki 
kesenjangan paling tinggi adalah keamanan dengan skor 1.16. Tidak ada elemen yang dinilai tidak memenuhi 
kesesuaian standar atau skor2.
Kesimpulan: Secara keseluruhan, Laboratorium Balitbangkes memiliki sistem manajemen biorisiko yang kuat 
dan sudah mapan disetiap elemen. Namun, tindakan perbaikan harus segera dilakukan di beberapa elemen untuk 
memenuhi standard CWA 15793:2011. (Health Science Journal of Indonesia 2018;9(2):70-5)
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 Abstract
Background: NIHRD laboratory was appointed as a national referral laboratory to perform laboratory detection 
for emerging infectious disease (EID). Because of its important role, NIHRD laboratory must implement biorisk 
management system. A reliable high containment laboratory is crucial to perform laboratory diagnosis for 
EIDs and to avoid further spread of EIDs.  The protection of laboratory workers, environment, and biological 
agents is achieved by addressing laboratory biorisk management consist of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity 
measures. This study aims to find gaps related the implementation of biorisk management with standard. 
Methods: This study was carried out by Professional Assessor in 2015 by conducting document checking and 
interviewing BSL-3 Technical Managers and BSO who were considered to have in-depth information regarding 
biosafety and biosecurity activities in NIHRD laboratory. Questionnaire developed based on CWA 15793:2011, 
which contain 160 questions provided from 16 elements of the standard. Analysis of the scores was interpreted 
between ranges of 0-2. Score 0 means full conformity and score 2 means doesn’t meet the required standard. 
Results: The study showed that only 3 out of 16 elements have full conformity with the standard. They 
were good microbiological technique, clothing and personal protective equipment, laboratory equipment 
and maintenance. The highest gap was in security elements with the score: 1.16. No elements has a non-
compliance with the standard or score 2. 
Conclusion: Overall the NIHRD laboratory has a strong biorisk management system already established 
which is working well in many areas. However, important action is needed in several elements in order to 
comply with the standard. (Health Science Journal of Indonesia 2018;9(2):70-5)
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The World Health Organization’s revised Inter national 
Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005 and each country 
members to develop the core capacities needed to 
detect, assess, report, and respond to events that could 
constitute a public health emergency of international 
concern (PHEIC).1 In terms of IHR, one of the core 
elements is Laboratory which provided vital support and 
facilitates the initiation and monitoring of public health 
interventions.2 Therefore strengthening laboratory 
services must have more attention to provide accurate 
and reliable outcome. NIHRD laboratory was appointed 
as a national referral laboratory to perform laboratory 
diagnosis for Emerging infectious Disease (EID), such 
as Avian Influenza (H5N1), H7N9, MERS-CoV, Ebola 
Virus Diseases (EVD) as well as other EIDs (Ministry 
of Health Decree no. 658/2009).3 A high containment 
(BSL 3) laboratory in NIHRD has been established 
and put into operation for this purpose. NIHRD is also 
tasked to be the National Influenza Centre (NIC) as 
part of the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System (GISRS) to monitor influenza trends and 
provide early detection of novel influenza viruses.4
Laboratory in capacity to detect microorganisms 
related to PHEIC must be implemented a safe and 
secure workplace, in order to protect workers from 
diseases infection occurred at laboratory or released 
from laboratory to environment intentionally.5 
Management of safety and secure at the laboratory 
called biosafety and biosecurity, where biosafety is 
refer to containment or a safe handling of pathogens, 
in order to reduce the risk of unintentional exposure 
or accidental release, while biosecurity means all 
necessary action to reduce the risk of unauthorized 
access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional 
release of valuable biological material (VBM).6 Both, 
biosafety and biosecurity in combination are often 
called biorisk, and to assure all element of biosafety 
and biosecurity are in place, biorisk management 
should be applied in Laboratory. NIHRD laboratory 
have obligation to implement biorisk management 
system because it’s important role in national 
health system as referral EID detection laboratory.3 
Laboratories that handle dangerous pathogens need 
to manage it biorisk to prevent any occurrence 
of human error intentionally or unintentionally 
in laboratory, implementing biorisk management 
approach and ethical responsibility.7 Equipment and 
facility may also contribute to the safety of laboratory 
according their level of pathogen handling.8 A reliable 
high containment laboratory is crucial to perform 
laboratory diagnosis for EIDs and to avoid further 
spread of EIDs.9 Especially with the existence of 
dual-use research issues that has the potential to be 
misused, addressing laboratory biorisk management 
has considered to be an action to prevent from bio-
weapon release from containment.10
There are a lot of tools to consider to measures 
the performance of laboratory in biosafety and 
biosecurity terms, in order to have specific needs 
based on its function.11,12,13 However, in terms of 
NIHRD Laboratory, Assessor was considering to 
use CEN Workshop Agreement (CWA) 15793:2011. 
This standard was use as an international guideline 
for laboratory biorisk management. It was developed 
by 73 stakeholders, facilitated by Comitee Europeen 
De Normalisation (CEN) on 2008 and revised 
in 2011.14 The CWA 15793:2011 was based on 
management system and risk based approach. 
Requirement of this standard were basic and 
applicable in laboratory handling biological agent/ 
toxin in all level, likewise, the guidelines for how 
to implement according to standards have also been 
made in Indonesia.15,16 Assessment using CWA 
15793:200 was needed to acknowledge how biorisk 
policy, objectives and processes to achieve on policy 
commitment was implemented in order to improve 
its performance. This study aims to find gaps related 
the implementation of biorisk management in 
NIHRD laboratory according to CWA 15793:2011. 
This study finding is important to develop policies 
and preventives procedures for the safe and secure 
work in NIHRD laboratory.
METHODS
This study was carried out by Professional Assessor 
from Robert Heckert Consulting supported by WHO 
in October 2015. Total 160 questions were determined 
by the Assessor based on the 16 elements and 61 sub 
elements of CWA 15793 standards as a guideline 
and assessment benchmark. The elements consist of 
managerial of biorisk in laboratory, risk assessment, 
inventory of pathogen and toxin, general safety, 
personnel and competency, good microbiological 
technique, clothing and personal protective 
equipment, human factors, health care, emergency 
response and contingency planning, accident/
incident investigation, facility physical requirement, 
equipment and main tenance, decontamination, 
disinfection and sterilization, transport procedure 
and security. The complete assessment has been 
done by interviewing two person involved closely 
with biorisk management in NIHRD laboratory, 
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Biosafety Officer (BSO) and Biosafety Laboratory 
Level 3 (BSL-3) Technical Manager. They were 
appointed based on Head of Biomedical and Basic 
Health Technology Center decree number HK.02.04/
II/56/2015. Both personnel was considered to have 
in-depth data in documentation and information 
related to biosafety and biosecurity activities in the 
NIHRD laboratory. Laboratory document records 
were also validated in place. The assessment system 
of scoring was used 1= fully met; 2 = partially met/
in progress; 3 = not met/not started. Implementation 




The number 1 in the gap score formula represents 
ideal assessment score (fully met). Therefore, if 
the implementation of all biorisk management sub-
elements is in conformity with the CWA 15793 
standard, the gaps score will be zero (0) or in other 
word, there is no gap between real implementation 
with the standard. Vice versa, if gaps score is 2.0 
then the implementation of all biorisk management 
sub-elements doesn’t meet the required standard.
RESULTS
Elements of biorisk management in CWA 15793 were 
based on 16 elements, and every element consists 
of sub-elements that represent all requirement of 
the standard. Result of the assessment showed that 
Satisfactory implemented elements were consider no 
gaps (gap score 0) in all the activities found in three 
elements: good microbiological technique, clothing 
and personal protective equipment and equipment 
and maintenance. No element found that did not 
conform to the standard (gap score 2). Average gap 
score of elements was between 0 and 1, which means 
that each element has already implemented, but 
some of the sub-element still needs improvement. 
Only two elements were scored over than 1, they 
were emergency response and contingency planning 
and security. It means that in these element most of 
the sub-elements doesn’t meet required standard and 
much more improvement was needed. (Table 1)
The assessment indicated that more than half activities 
of NIHRD biorisk management programs are in 
place, but still there are some elements in specific 
sub element need to be improved. As in first element, 
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elements was between 0 and 1, which means that each 
element has already implemented, but some of the 
sub-element still needs improvement. Only two 
elements were scored over than 1, they were 
emergency response and contingency planning and 
security. It means that in these element most of the 
sub-elements doesn’t meet required standard and 
much more improvement was needed. (Table 1) 
The assessment indicated that more than half activities 
of NIHRD biorisk management programs are in place, 
but still there are some elements in specific sub 
element need to be improved. As in first element, 
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Biorisk management system, which have 13 sub 
elements to be addressed, and scores in sub elements 
was showed that policy, roles and responsibility, 
audits and inspection has become a shortcoming of 
these elements. Some sub-elements that are seen with 
high scores compared to the questions indicate that 
there is a significant inconsistency with the standard. 
They are monitoring and control in element number 3, 
contingency plans in element number 10, 
commissioning and decommissioning in element 
number 12, Information security and personnel 
control in element number 16. 
In terms of general requirement and policy, the 
study found that almost all aspect of important 
requirement were fulfilled, however the lack of 
documentation records were occurred in many 
elements and implementation of routine audit were 
not fulfilled. The gap score indicates that the 
highest value element is an element that needs to be 
prioritized to improve, and in this study, we found 
that the highest gaps score which has more than 1 
score was element security and the second highest 
is emergency respond and contingency. 
DISCUSSION 
Biorisk management approach is built on the concept 
of continual improvement through a cycle of planning, 
do, correct and act (PDCA) in order to achieve 
conformity with the standard.17 It is intended to 
effectively identify, monitor and control the 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity activities. Many 
standard was built base on international agreement 
and guideline such as CWA 15793:2011, WHO, CDC 
and ISO.6,18,19 Some countries will adopt them as a 
national guidelines. in Indonesia, regulations related 
to biorisk management are made based on 
international guidelines as well, with a few 
modifications that are appropriate to the conditions of 
the country.16,9 Every laboratory has different issues 
regarding their actual implementation of standard. 
Most standard was referring to ideal condition which 
will be different with the actual condition of each 
laboratory must encounter, like environment or 
culture. However, Laboratory management should 
create roles and responsibilities to biorisk policies, 
rules and regulations according to it scope of work, 
with any special emphasis regarding their issues to 
protecting workers, environment and the product.20,21
Biorisk management system, which have 13 sub 
elements to be addressed, and scores in sub elements 
was showed that policy, roles and responsibility, 
audits and inspection has become a shortcoming 
of these elements. Some sub-elements that are seen 
with high scores compared to the questions indicate 
that there is a significant inconsistency with the 
standard. They re mo itoring and control in element 
nu ber 3, conti gency plan  in eleme t nu ber 10, 
commissioning and decommissio ing in element 
number 12, Information security and personnel 
control in element number 16.
In terms of general requirement and policy, the study 
found that almost all aspect of important requirement 
were fulfilled, however the lack of documentation 
records were occurred in many elements and 
implementation of routin  audi were not fulfilled. 
The gap score indicates that the highest value 
element s an element that needs to be prioritized to 
improve, and in this study, we found that the highest 
gaps score which has more than 1 score was element 
security and the second highest is emergency respond 
and contingency.
DISCUSSION
Biorisk management approach is built on the 
concept of continual improvement through a cycle 
of planning, do, correct and act (PDCA) in order 
to achieve conformity with the standard.17 It is 
intended to effectively identify, monitor and control 
the laboratory biosafety and biosecurity activities. 
Many standard was built base on international 
agreement and guideline such as CWA 15793:2011, 
WHO, CDC and ISO.6,18,19 Some countries will 
adopt them as a national guidelines. in Indonesia, 
regulations related to biorisk management are made 
based on international guidelines as well, with a few 
modifications that are appr priate t  the conditions of 
the country.16,9 Every laboratory has different issues 
regarding their actual implementation of standard. 
Most standard was referring to ideal condition which 
will be different with the actual c ndition of each 
laboratory must encounter, like environment or 
culture. However, Laboratory management should 
create roles and responsibilities to biorisk policies, 
rules and regulations according to it scope of work, 
with any special emphasis regarding their issues to 
protecting workers, environment and the product.20,21
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Table 1. Total Scores of elements
No Element Sub element, Score and number of Question Assessment Score Gaps
Sub element S Q
1 Biorisk management 1) Biorisk management policy 37 13 140 0.77
system 2) Objective, targets and programs 8 4
3) Roles, responsibilities and authorities 43 30
4) Records, document and data controls 3 2
5) Analysis of data 2 1
6) Change management 1 1
7) Consultation and communication 3 3
8) Program of work 2 2
9) Work planning and capacity 1 1
10) Legal requirement 2 1
11) Continual improvement 2 1
12) Preventive action 4 2
13) Control of non-conformities 2 2
14) Inspection and audits 12 4
15) Corrective actions 3 2
16) Contractor and suppliers 6 5
17) Biorisk management review 7 4
18) Biorisk management system 2 1
2 Risk Assessment 1) Process, Methodologies and 8 4 24 0.71
Procedures
2) Assessment timing and scope 2 1
3) Roles and responsibilities 2 1
4) Hazard Identification 3 2
5) Risk assessment 6 3
6) Risk Control 3 3
3 Pathogen and toxin 1) Inventory 2 1 14 1
inventory and 2) Information and records 6 3
information 3) Transfer  of  biological  agent  and 1 1
Toxins
4) Monitoring and control 5 2
4 General Safety 1) General safety 2 1 2 1
5 Personnel and 1) Recruitment 2 1 17 0.54
Competency 2) Training 1 1
3) Competence 12 7
4) Continuity and succession planning 1 1
5) Exclusion 1 1
6 Good Microbiological 1) Good microbiological technique 2 2 2 0
Technique
7 Clothing and personal 1) Clothing and personal protective 2 2 2 0
protective equipment Equipment
8 Human Factors 1) Human Factors 2 1 2 1
9 Healthcare 1) Worker Health Program 2 2 9 0.5
2) Vaccination of personnel 5 3
3) Medical Emergencies 2 1
10 Emergency responds 1) Emergency scenario 2 1 23 1.09
and contingency 2) Emergency response and planning 10 5
planning 3) Emergency plans Emergency 6 3
exercise and simulation 2 1
4) Contingency plans 3 1
11 Accident/incident 1) Accident/incident Investigation 2 1 2 1
Investigation
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No Element
Sub element, Score and number of Question
Assessment Score Gaps
Sub element S Q
12 Facility Physical 1) Planning, design and Verification 6 5 11 0.37
Requirement 2) Commissioning and
Decommissioning 5 2
3) Infrastructure and operational
Management 1 1
13 Equipment and 4) Maintenance management 1 1 5 0
maintenance 5) Control of equipment 1 1
6) Calibration 1 1
7) Certification 1 1
8) Validation 1 1
14 Decontamination, Management of biological waste 4 4 6 0.2
disinfection, Inactivation of Biological agents and 2 1
sterilization Toxins
15 Transport procedure Transport procedures 2 1 2 1
16 Security 1) Physical security 2 1 13 1.16
2) Information security 5 2
3) Personnel control 5 2
4) Personal security 1 1
Assessment of biorisk management conducted in 
Laboratory Hospital in Bangkok, Thailand using 
biosafety practices tools adopted from Centers for 
Diseases Control (CDC) and National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) guidelines.18,22 The study found that appropriate 
of protective barriers were need to be strengthened. 
23 It means that there are issues in their facilities and 
equipment needed according to biosafety requirements. 
In Singapore, audits for biosafety requirement was 
conducted in University Laboratories and in Nanyang 
Technological University, using WHO Biosafety 
Manual and NTU safety manual for biological work 
and local requirement, and found that issues regarding 
consistency of biosafety commitments in laboratory. 12
In Indonesia, the assessments study of biosafety 
and biosecurity was also conducted in University of 
Indonesia, using adopted tools from WHO guidelines 
and the National University of Singapore (University 
NUS) laboratory manual for 38 laboratories worked 
with pathogen. It found that action of improvement was 
in human resource (good microbiological techniques 
and recommended work practices) and emergency 
response.24 NIHRD laboratory in cooperation with 
WHO was also assessed biosecurity in seven regional 
and central reference labs in 2010, with the result that 
physical security, employee management and information 
security have not been adequately implemented.25
Our study finding was mainly in the area of policy 
and documentation. Policy statement from top 
management was not socialize and noticed within 
laboratory staff, since the institution guideline was 
not published yet. While, The challenge with the 
security element is the need to improvement of 
the personnel reliability policy and competency. 
The procedure of laboratory staff recruitment 
was not controlled by the laboratory management 
but administered by higher level in Institution 
causing inadequate test for personal performance 
and competency. There were no written standard 
operating procedures has been documented yet 
for the response and contingency planning and 
system, where in the event of emergency, adequate 
contingency measures is needed to be address.
Corrective actions that must be carried out 
prioritized those that are important and urgent 
according to assessor were as follow: 1) develop a 
policy statement from top management regarding 
biorisk management based upon the elements found 
in CWA 15793 and 16393; 2) develop a biorisk 
management manual based upon the CWA 15793 
elements as a guide and table of contents; 3) ensure 
that NIHRD is in compliance with all Indonesian 
regulatory requirements regarding the operation 
and risks associated with the activities carried out 
in the institute; 4) begin an audit/inspection process 
of all labs based upon a biosafety guideline (US, 
Canadian, WHO, etc.) to determine the status of 
biorisk implementation; 5) develop, implement and 
document a formal risk assessment process; 6) begin 
better documentation of risk management decisions 
at all levels and in all areas; 7) ensure that only staff 
Vol. 9, No.2, December 2018 Assessment of biorisk management implementation in NIHRD Laboratory 75
with the full immunization and required protective 
titers are allowed to work with pathogens being 
protected against; 8) establish a uniform incident/ 
accident reporting system for all laboratories and 
encourage reporting of all incidents and near misses; 
9) define and implement a personnel reliability policy.
In conclusion, overall the NIHRD laboratory has a strong 
biorisk management system already established which is 
working well in many areas. However, some elements 
need to prioritized and important actions must be taken 
to follow the recommendations of the assessor to comply 
with the standards, in order to assess the performance of 
the system and NIHRD needs to establish an assessment 
review using the same CWA 15793 checklist which can 
be repeated to ensure that the elements are improving, in 
order to have safe and secure laboratory.
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